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NOTES
Interest and Costs in Determining Federal Jurisdiction
The Judiciary Act of 17891 and its various amendments 2 excluded
costs from computation in determining the value of the matter in controI. The Judiciary Act of 1789, I STAT. 78 (848), provided that the "Circuit Courts
shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all
suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds,
exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and the United States
are plaintiffs or petitioners; or an alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of
the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State." (Italics supplied
as in all the following quotations.) Concerning the amount, see Warren, New Light
on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of r789 (1923) 37 HARv. L. REv. 49, 78.
Note that the phrase used is matter in dispute. This was retained until the Act.of
1911, 36 STAT. 1091 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §41, which introduced the phrase matter in
controversy, presumably, on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in In re Metropolitan Railway Receivership, 2o8 U. S. 9o (1907). The defendant maintained that
under the Act of 1888, which retained the original phrase "matter in dispute," there was
no dispute because he admitted the debt and consented to the appointment of a receiver.
The Court. inter alia, discussed the meaning of the word controversy and concluded
that it did not necessarily mean a contest. In those instances where the Judiciary Act
of 1789 allowed removal of the cause from the state court to the Circuit Court (suits
against an alien, suits involving diversity of citizenship, citizens of the same state
claiming under land grants of different states) it was necessary also that the "matter
in dispute" exceed "the sum or value of five hundred dollars, exclusive of costs." Id.
at 79-8o. Regarding the appellate jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts, the Act provided: ".

.

. from final decrees in a district court in cases of admiralty and maritime

jurisdiction, where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of three hundred
dollars, exclusive of costs, an appeal shall be allowed to the next circuit court. .. ."
Id. at 83. The Circuit Courts were also given power to re-examine ".

.

. final decrees

and judgments in civil actions in a district court, where the matter in dispute exceedo
the sum or value of fifty dollars, exclusive of costs." Id. at 84. The Supreme Court
was given jurisdiction to review: "Final decrees in civil actions, and suits in equity in
a circuit court, brought there by original process or removed there from courts of
the several States, or removed there by appeal from a district court where the matter
in dispute-exceeds the sum or value of two thousand dollars, exclusive of costs." Id.
at 84. For other monetary limitations on the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court see POUND. APPELLATE JURIsDIciON IN CIVIL CASES (1941) 146 et seq. By
the Judicial Code, 36 STAT. 1167 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §43oa (1941) the Circuit Courts
were abolished and their powers conferred upon regenerated District Courts. Today
the District Court has jurisdiction in cases involving a federal question, diversity of
citizenship, or alienage," ". . . where the matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of
interest and costs, the sum or value of $3,000." 36 STAT. 1091 (19II), 28 U. S. C. § 41
(1) (1941). There has been a plethora of litigation on the problem of 'defining the
"matter in controversy." See a general note in 34 COL. L. REv. 311 (1934). In Central
Mexico Light and Power v. Munch, 116 F. (2d) 85, 87 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) Judge
Clark remarked: "The so-called plaintiff's viewpoint test . . . seems now well
settled.

.

.

."

The plaintiff's-viewpoint rule was formulated by Dobie: "The

amount in controversy in the United States District Court is always to be determined
by the value to the plaintiff of the right which he in good faith asserts in his pleading
that sets forth the operative facts which constitute his cause of action." Dobie, Jurisdictional Amount in the Federal District Courts, 38 HARV. L. R-v. 733 (1925). See
also Notes (1936) lO TULANE L. R,.. 289; 49 YALE L. J. 274 (1939).
2. In the Act of March 3, 1803, 2 STAT. 244 (1848) the Circuit Courts were given
the power to review decrees of the District Courts, ". . . where the matter in dispute.
exclusive of costs, shall exceed the sum or value of fifty dollars." The same Act provided that ".

.

. from all final judgments or decrees . . . rendered . . . in any cir-

cuit court . . . in any cases of equity, of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and
of prize or no prize, an appeal where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, shall
exceed the sum or value of two thousand dollars, shall be allowed to the Supreme Court
of the United States. .

.

."

Id. at 244 (italics added).
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versy. In particular, the jurisdictional amount in the Circuit Courts was
settled at five hundred dollars exclusive of costs. The Act of 1888 ' raised
this amount to two thousand dollars and excluded both interest and costs.
In raising the amount from five hundred to two thousand dollars and excluding interest for the first time, Congress without doubt intended to cir-

cumscribe 4 the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts. Thus, the problem of
inclusion of interest in determining the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts
dates from 1888.

However, the problem had previously arisen with refer-

ence to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,5 despite the fact that the
3. Act of August 13, 1888, 25 STAT. 433 (1889). This Act was passed to correct
the many errors in the enrollment of the Act of March 3, 1887, 24 STAT. 552 (i886).
The purpose of the Act of 1887 was to contract the broad jurisdiction given to the
federal courts by the Act of 1875, IS STAT. 470 (1875). The Act of 1888 provided that: "The Circuit Courts of the United States shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil
nature, at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of
interest and costs, the mon or value of two thousand dollars, and arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their authority, or in which controversy the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners, or in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of different states,
in which the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or
value aforesaid, or a controversy between citizens of the same State claiming land
under grants of different States, or a controversy between citizens of a State and foreign states, citizens, or subjects, in which the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of
interest and costs, the sum or value aforesaid." (Italics supplied.) Removal jurisdiction was made dependent on original jurisdiction. Compare 28 U. S. C. § 71 (94).
Under the Act of 1875, interest accruing before the institution of the suit in the
state court, which was subsequently removed, was included in computing the value of
the matter in controversy, but interest accruing after the institution of the suit was
excluded. Carrick v. Landman, 20 Fed. 209 (C. C. N. D. Ala. 1884) ; see also Roberts
v. Nelson, 20 Fed. Cas. 900, No. 11,9o7 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1870). Contra: McGinnity v. White, 16 Fed. Cas. 116, No. 8,802 (C. C. D. Neb. 1874). Judge Dillon (at
117) remarked: "The action being ex-contractu, the right to interest follows upon
establishing the right to the principal sum, and may propefly be included in determining the amount of the matter in dispute. I confess to doubts respecting the soundness
of the foregoing view, but have adopted it because it seems to be equally consistent
with the language of the act (Act of July 27, 1866, amending the Act of 1789 in that
application for removal could be made down to the final hearing) and more consistent
with the reason and purpose of it than the opposite conclusion, denying the right to
removal on the ground that the amount was insufficient, when, if judgment should
then be rendered in the state court, it would be for a sum greater than that which the
act adopts as giving the defendant the right to transfer." Compare DILLON, REMTOVAL
OF CAUSES (1889) § 94. See the interesting case of American Surety Co. v. Ritchie,
191 S. W. (2d) 137 (Tex. 1945). holding that under both Texas and federal law,
interest which ,is not due eo no nine, but which must be affirmatively alleged and
sought as part of the damage claimed will be considered in computing the matter in
controversy.
4. "This is the first case in this court upon this act. Although the act bears on
its face marks of great haste and an unusual lack of care in its passage, and is in some
particulars obscure, its purpose is clear to abridge the jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States." Moore v. Town of Edgefield, 32 Fed. 498, 499 (C. C. S. C. 1887).
See MooN, THE REmoVAL OF CAUSES (1901) § 38. The impulse towards the contraction of the scope of the jurisdiction of the federal courts has been twofold: (I) To
affect the distribution of power between the two systems of our federalism. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts (1928)
13 CoR. L. Q. 490; Frankfurter and Hart, The Business ,of the Supreme Court at
October Term, 1934 (I935) 49 HARv. L. Ray. 68, 91. "Due regard for the rightful
independence of state governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that
they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute
has defined." Healy v. Ratta, see note 20 infra at 270. (2) To exclude from the federal forum claims of small value. Davis v. Mills, 99 Fed. 39, 40 (C. C. Conn. 1900).
5. The statute requiring that in certain cases coming from the Supreme Court of
the Philippines the matter in controversy must exceed $25,000 is the sole survivor of
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relevant statutes excluded costs only. Some rules had become well-defined.
Neither interest on the judgment nor costs of the suit below could enter
into the computation of the jurisdictional amount in the Supreme Court."
This amount was determined by the value of the judgment brought for
review. Interest, however, accruing before the rendition of the judgment
7
appealed from and included therein was considered part of the value of
the matter in controversy in the Supreme Court. It is interesting to,note
that while these various statutes controlling the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court excluded costs only, the Court by judicial legislation arrived at the
exclusion also of interest on the judgment, presumably because of the
possibility, otherwise, of conferring jurisdiction on the Supreme Court by
merely delaying review proceedings. This early implicit disapproval by the
Supreme Court of conferring appellate jurisdiction by delay was later relied
on by a lower court to prohibit the conferring of original jurisdiction likewise under the Act of 1888.
Thus, in one of the first 1 cases decided by a Circuit Court under the
Act of 1888, the plaintiff sought the principal amounts of bonds and
matured interest coupons amounting to less than two, thousand dollars, and
interest on both of these items, which if added would have made up the
a system of statutes imposing jurisdictional minimums in appeals to the Supreme Court.
43 STAT. 940 (1925), 28 U. S. C. § 349 (1941). By this Act of February 13, 1925, 43
STAT. 936 (1925). 28 U. S. C. A. 225 (a) subd. 3, 4 (1927) the Circuit Courts of
Appeals were given appellate jurisdiction over final decisions in the District Courts
for Alaska and for the Virgin Islands in cases other than those involving a federal
question where the ". . value in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds
$1,ooo . . ," and over decisions- of the Supreme Courts of Hawaii and Porto Rico
in all cases other than those involving a federal question ". . . wherein the value in
controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds $5,000. . . ." Luce v. Cintron, 73
F. (2d) 481 (C. C. A. Ist, 1934) appears to be the only case which arose under these
statutes involving "interest and costs"; it involved an appeal from a judgment for
costs only and the Circuit Court of Appeals was held to be without jurisdiction. The
jurisdictional minimum is no longer in effect for the District Courts of Alaska and the
Virgin Islands, but 28 U. S. C. § 225 (I94I) still limits the jurisdiction in cases coming from the Supreme Courts of Hawaii and Puerto Rico. While the computation of
the value of the matter in controversy presents different problems as regards original,
removal or appellate jurisdiction, courts and text writers had not always kept these
categories distinct. See DoBiE, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL JURISDICIONT (1928) 828.
6. Bank of United States v. Daniel, 12 Pet. 32 (U. S. 1838) ; Knapp v. Banks, 2
How. 73 (U. S. 1844) ; Walker v. United States, 4 Wall. 163 (U. S. 1866) ; Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Rogers, 93 U. S. 565 (1876); Baltimore & P. Ry. v. Trook, IOO
U. S. 112 (1879) ; District of Columbia v. Gannon, 130 U. S. 227 (1889). See also
Johnson v. Tully, 2 Ariz. 223, 12 Pac. 567 (1887); Openshaw v. Utah & N. Ry., 6
Utah 268, 21 Pac. 999 (1889).
7. The Patapsco, 12 Wall. 451 (U. S. 187o); The Rio Grande, ig Wall. 178
(U. S. 1873); N. Y. Elevated Ry. v. Fifth Nat. Bank, 118 U. S. 6o8 (1886); Zeckendorf v. Johnson, 123 U. S. 617 (1887) ; Quebec S. S. Co. v. Merchant, 133 U. S. 375
(189o) ; Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 61o (I89O) ; Mass Ben. Asso. v. Miles, 137 U. S.
689 (1891) ; Benson Min. & Smelting Co. v. Alta Min. & Smelting Co., 145 U. S. 428
(1892) ; Guthrie Nat. Bank v. Guthrie, 173 U. S. 528 (1899). But no inclusion of
interest was made unless the interest was specially claimed. Udall v. Steamship Ohio.,
I7 How. 17 (U. S. 1854) ; Olney v. Steamship Falcon, 17 How. 1g (U. S. 1854). The
plaintiff could not move to amend the judgment so as to include interest not originally
claimed. Northern P. Ry. v. Booth, 152 U. S. 671 (1894).
S. Moore v. Town of Edgefield, 32 Fed. 498 (C. C. S. C. 1887). Accord: Athan
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 73 F. (2d) 66 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) ; City of Pawhuska, Okla.
v. Midland Valley Ry., 33 F. (2d) 487 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929); Home Life Ins. Co. v.
Sipp, 1i F. (2d) 474 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1926) ; A. H. Marshall Co., Inc. v. Buick Motor
Co., 251 Fed. 685 (N. D. N. Y. 1918) ; Royal Ins. Co. of Liverpool, Eng. v. Stoddard
et al., 2oi Fed. 915 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912) ; Turner v. Jackson Lumber Co., 159 Fed. 923
(C. C. A. 5th, 1908).

404

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94

requisite jurisdictional amount. The plaintiff contended that since the Act,
which excluded interest for the first time, excluded both interest and costs
in a phrase, and since costs did not arise until after the suit was begun, the
interest to be excluded by the statute was only that interest which like
costs did not accrue until after the suit was begun, 9 but that interest
accrued prior to the institution of the suit was not excluded. In denying
this Argument by the plaintiff, the court pointed out:
"The decisions of the supreme court had already decided that
accruing interest as well as costs do not enter into the computation in
determining the limits of its jurisdiction. The language is the same
'when the matter in dispute exclusive of costs exceeds $500o.' Here
neither interest on the judgment nor costs of the suit can enter into
computation . . . By analogy of reasoning, where a matter in dispute,

exclusive of costs, did not exceed $500, the accrual of interest of the
suit brought could not have created jurisdiction in the circuit court
under the law as it stood before the act was passed." 10

That is to say, the court felt that Congress in the Act of 1888 intended to
do more than declare the "existing law," i. e. the rule which the court
arrived at by making an analogy between a judgment rendered in a lower
court (which judgment was appealed to the Supreme Court) and the institution of a suit in a lower court. Since interest was by a line of decisions "1
of the Supreme Court not allowed on the judgment below, this court concluded that interest pendente lite in a suit begun in the Circuit Court could
not have been allowed, either, in computing the value of the matter in
controversy. Hence, the interest to be excluded by the Act was that interest which had accrued up to the time of the institution of the suit
in the Circuit Court. This result, which was concurred in by a Circuit
Court of New York 12 in the same year, is based practically upon the very
real danger of the possibility of "creating jurisdiction," where interestbearing obligations are concerned, by merely delaying the commencement of
suit within the period of the statute of limitations until the principal
amount and accrued interest exceed the jurisdictional minimum.
Soon afterwards, the Supreme Court, in its first adjudication under
the Act of 1888 on the subject of the statutory exception of interest and
costs drew a distinction which was not only inimical to the purposes of
Congress, but was of such subtlety that its application has since vexed the
courts. In Brown v. Webster,1" the plaintiff bought land for $1,2oo from
9. But cf. DomE, op. cit. supra, note 5 at 156. "Sufficient reason for the 9tatutory
exclusion of costs would seem to be found in the fact that these normally abide the
outcome of the suit." The court in Moore v. Town of Edgefield, 32 Fed. 498, 5o (C.
C. S. C. 1887) pointed out: ". . . when the jurisdiction depends on the amount, this
amount on the day suit is brought must exceed the minimum fixed by law. And when
the amount is ascertained by excluding from the matter in dispute interest as well as
costs, the interest to be excluded must be the interest due on that day. But it is said
that the act also excludes costs. So it does, but we must remember that costs accrue
the instant the suit begins, . . . and therefore there is neither looseness nor impropriety in the expression that there must be excluded from the calculation the costs
existing on the day suit is brought as well as interest accrued up to that time."
io. Moore v. Town of Edgefield, 32 Fed. 498, 499, 500 (C. C. S. C. 1887).
I1. Supra note 6.
12. Lazensky v. Supreme Lodge Knights of Honor, 32 Fed. 417 (C. C. N. Y. 1887).
13. 156 U. S. 328 (895).
Accord: Schlorer v. Mangin, 39 F. Supp. 64 (E. D.
N. Y. 1941) (judgment in penalty amount) ; Simecek v. United States Nat. Bank of

19461
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the defendant who gave a warranty deed. Later, after the plaintiff had
been evicted, he sued the defendant for damages to the amount of $6,6oo.
Under a Nebraska statute, only the purchase price with interest could
be recovered in cases of eviction; and th6 defendant insisted that since the
amount recoverable was only $1,200 with interest, the matter in controversy did not exceed the required minimum of two thousand dollars
exclusive of interest and costs. In holding that the Circuit Court had
jurisdiction Justice White pointed to (what he called) the elementary distinction between interest as such and the use of an interest calculation as an
instrumentality in arriving at the amount of damages to be awarded oft
the principal demand.14 The principal demand in this case was considered
the legal unit of damages without any reference to its constituent elements.
It was held that the interest demanded was not accessory to any principal
demand, and as such would have been excluded by the statute; but the
interest demanded was itself part of the principal demand. The obvious
import of this decision-that the inclusion of interest may depend upon
whether the action brought is ex delicto or ex contractu-was graphically
demonstrated in a case "I where the plaintiff sued the treasurer of the city
for damages for not paying a city warrant when in funds, after payment
had been originally refused. Said the court:
"The liability of the treasurer arises by reason of his refusal to discharge an official duty towards the plaintiff, and sounds in damages,
the measure of which.is the amount of the warrant with accumulated
interest to the time his liability became fixed. Had the city been sued,
the case would be different, because the obligation would then have been
on the warrant, and the principal without interest would have been
the measure of juisdiction." 16
In thus suggesting that the result would have been different had the party
defendant been changed (since this would have changed the form of action
brought even though the same two items, the warrant and accumulated interest thereon, would have been involved), the court carried the Webster
doctrine to its logical limit. In the Webster case there was at least "price,
Omaha, Neb., 91 F. (2d) 214 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937) (damages for conspiracy to defraud); Fitchner v. American Surety Co. of New York, 2 F. Supp. 321 (N. D. Fla.,
1933) (action on supersedeas bond) ; Dillon v. Lineker, 266 Fed. 688 (C. C. A. 9th,
I92O) (breach, of contract to pay mortgage) ; Chesbrough v. Woodworth et al., 251
Fed. 881 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918) (damages for fraudulent representations) ; Central Commercial Co. v. Jones-Dusenbury Co., 251 Fed. 13 (C. C. A. 7th, igis) (breach of contract of sale).
14. The fountain-head of all difficulties is the following: "This contention overlooks the elementary distinction between interest as such and the use of an interest
calculation as an instrumentality in arriving at the amount of damages to be awarded
on the principal demand. As we have said, the recovery sought was not the price and
interest thereon, but the sum of the damage resulting from eviction. All such damage
was, therefore, the principal demand in controversy, although interest and price and
other things may have constituted some of the elements entering into the legal unit, the
damage which the party was entitled to recover. . . . Indeed, the confusion of
thought which the assertion of want of jurisdiction involves is a failure to distinguish
between a principal and an accessory demand. The sum of the principal demand determines the question of jurisdiction; the accessory or interest demand cannot be computed for jurisdictional purposes. Here the entire damage claimed was the principal
demand without reference to the constituent elements entering therein." Brown v.
Webster, 156 U. S. 328 at 329.
15. Intermela v. Perkins, 205 Fed. 6o3 (C. C. A. 9th, 1913).

i6. Id. at 606.
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interest, eviction and other things." "7 What, if any, justification is there
for such a distinction?
Unless the law provides a different rule, the sum claimed 18 by the plaintiff in good faith determines the value of the matter in controversy. In the
federal courts there is no presumption' 9 of jurisdiction, and the plaintiff
must bear the burden of proof of demonstrating to the court that the
court has jurisdiction, under a policy of strict 20 construction of jurisdictional statutes. The court may at any time dismiss the action on motion
or sua sponte 21 for want of jurisdiction. These considerations have led the
courts to determine the fact of the presence of jurisdictional amount from
the petition of the plaintiff who chooses the federal forum; and it follows
22
with consistency, that whether the interest demanded is interest as such
or merely an instrumentality in arriving at the amount of damages should
be determined from the face of the plaintiff's petition. If the plaintiff seeks
a sum as unliquidated damages, frames his petition ex delicto,22 and in the
ad dannum places his damages, including interest, above the jurisdictional
amount, then the interest claimed will be computed 24 in determining the
value of the matter in controversy. Any ex contractu theory of the plaintiff's petition will lead to a jurisdictionally disastrous result. Where the
interest sought may be considered in the nature of a penalty

25

it is clear

that it will also be counted as part of the jurisdictional amount, since the
demand is not accessorial. But while the Webster doctrine perhaps finds
17. Voorhees v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 25o Fed. 484 (D. C. N. J. 1918) at 486,
"There seems to be nothing but the amount of the policy and 'moratory interest' constituting the elements of damage in this case, while in Brown v. Webster there was
price, interest, eviction and 'other things' for all of which interest might be a very
inadequate measure of damages." Also compare the language in A. H. Marshall Co.
v. Buick Motor Co., note 8 supra at 689. "In the instant case two specific and specified sums are alleged to be due the plaintiff, and are sued for and judgment therefore
specially demanded. ..

."

18. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.. 303 U. S.283 (1938).
also Berman v. Inman & Poulen & Co., 91 Fed. 2!93 (C. C. Ore. 1898).

See

1g. Associated Press v. Emmett, 45 F. Supp. 907, 914 (S. D. Calif. 1942).
Healy v. Ratta, 292 U. S. 263, 270 (1933) ; Fechheimer Bros. v. Barnwasser,
3 F. R. D. 394 (E. D. Ky. 1944).
20.

21. "If in any suit commenced in a district court, or removed from a State court
to a district court of the United States, it shall appear to the satisfaction of the said
district court, at any time after such suit has been brought or removed thereto, that
such suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly
within the jurisdiction of said district court, . . . the said district court shall proceed no further therein, but shall dismiss the suit or remand it to the court from which
it was removed, as justice may require. . . ." 36 STAT. 1098 (1911), 28 U. S. C.
§ 80 (1941). See also McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. of Indiana, 298
U. S. 178 (1936).
22. "Interest as such" has also been referred to as "moratory interest" or "interest ex inora" or "interest eo nomine." A Texas jurisdictional statute excludes interest
eo nomine by that name, and a long line of cases exists in which the court has applied
the dichotomous treatment of interest of the Webster case. See note 14 supra. The

cases are collected in Note (1932) 77 A. L. R. 991, ioo2.
23. Cf. Wilson v. Daniel, 3 Dall. 401, 407 (U. S. 1798) : "Thus, in an action of

debt on a bond for iool, the principal and interest are put in demand and the plaintiff
can recover no more, though he may lay his damages at io,oooi. The form of the
action, therefore, gives in that case the legal right." See also, United Lens Corp. v.
Doray'Lamp Co., 93 F. (2d) 969 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937).
24. "The action is in tort; alleged damages exceed the prescribed amount; the
declaration discloses nothing rendering such recovery impossible; no bad faith ap-.
pears." Such are the minimum requirements set out in the case of Chesbrough v. Northern Trust Co., 252 Fed. 83, 84 (C. C. A. 6th, 1920).
25. Cahill v. Hovenden, 132 F. (2d) 422, 424 (C. C. A. ioth, 1942) ; Hovenden v.
City of Bristow, Okla., 34 F. Supp. 675 (N. D. Okla. 194o). See also Kansas City
Southern Ry. v. Oregon Levee Dist., 15 F. (2d) 637, 644 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
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a convenient rationalization as a further refinement of the plaintiff's-viewpoint rule 28 suggested by Dobie, is there any less reason for excluding
interest which is an instrumentality in arriving at the measure of damages
in the light of the possibility here too of invoking jurisdiction by delay in
bringing suit?
In accordance with the policy of the Act of 1888, it was early held 27
that matured interest-coupons should be excluded in determining the value
of the matter in controversy, the court seeing nothing in the nature of
interest coupons to exempt them from the category of interest under the
statute. This same discernment was not shared five years later by the
Supreme Court in Edwards v. Bates County,28 the same Court which had
decided the Webster case. In an action to recover on a municipal bond
it was held that the matured interest coupons could be counted as part of
the jurisdictional amount. The Court, struck by the fact that interest
coupons have perhaps all the attributes of commercial paper,'2 saw in such
coupons not accessorial demands, but separate and independent promises
to pay. It is true that each coupon is a separable promise to pay to bearer;
that the coupons can be negotiated by the bondholder; that the coupons
could in themselves provide the basis of suit; that the statute of limitations begins to run at their maturity; that they bear interest. But however
important these characteristics of interest coupons may be in the mercantile
world, they are hardly determinative of questions of jurisdiction. The
fundamental reason for excluding the interest of interest-bearing obligations (the possibility of invoking jurisdiction by delay) applies just as
well to the interest represented by interest coupons when sued upon in
connection with the bond to which they are attached. Moreover, even the
special characteristics of interest coupons are not entirely unique. Interest
coupons may themselves be sued upon. But if A lends B $ioo,ooo at 6
per cent. interest annually, A, at the end of the first year, upon B's default
in paying the $6ooo interest installment could sue 30 B in the District
Court (diversity of citizenship, for example, or a federal question being
present). Interest coupons may be negotiated, but A could conceivably
assign his interest claim against B to X, and X could sue B in the District Court. Nor is the fact that interest coupons themselves bear interest
i.
Howard v. Bates County, 43 Fed. 276, 278 (C. C. W. D. Mo. i8go): "So far

26. Supra note
27.

from discovering anything connected with the history of the Act of March 3, 1887,
indicating that congress did not employ the word 'interest' as a generic term in its
most comprehensive sense, the design of the judiciary act in question, in contradistinction of its predecessors, is to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts." See
also The City v. Lamson, 9 Wall. 477, 483 (U. S. 1869).
28. 163 U. S. 269 (1895). Accord: Hovenden v. City of Bristow, Okla., 34 F.
Supp. 674 (N. D. Okla. 194o); Brown-Crummer Inv. Co. v. City of Florala, Ala., 55
F. (2d) 238 (M. D. Ala. 1931) ; Tyler County, Tex. v. Town, 23 F. (2d) 371 (C. C.
A. 5th. 1928) ; Greene County v. Kortrecht, Si Fed. 241 (C. C. A. 5th, 1897). See
also York v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 143 F. (2d) 503, 518 (C. C. A. 2d,
1944). "The confusion of thought to which we alluded in the case of Brown v. Webster, . . . is also involved in the decision below, that is, the failure to distinguish
between a principal and accessory demand." Instant case at 272.
29. Nesbit v. Riverside Independent District, 144 U. S. 61o (1892)
(each matured coupon on a negotiable bond is a separable promise to pay) ; Amy v. Dubuque,
98 U. S. 470 (1878) (statute of limitations begins to run against coupon warrants from
time they mature, although attached to bond); Clark v. Iowa City, 87 U. S. 583
(1874) ; Aurora v. West, 7 Wall. 82 (U. S. 1868) (interest coupons draw interest
after payment refused).
30. Compare Brusselback v. Chicago Joint Stock Land Bank, 85 F. (2d) 617
(C. C. A. 7th, 1936).
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unique. Interest may be compounded, i. e. the interest itself bears interest. The terms principal and interest are correlative and mutually exclusive terms.31 Compared to the bonds to which they are attached interest
coupons are interest, but contrasted with the interest which they themselves bear they are principal. So too with compound interest; the interest which first accrues as compared to the principal sum is interest, but
this interest which first accrues as compared to the interest which accrues
upon it is principal. These relationships were interestingly involved in
Fritchen v. Mueller 3, in which the plaintiff sued on a note for $3,000
with interest. The note sued upon contained the following provision:
"With interest payable at 6 per cent. from date and 8 per cent. from
maturity until paid, and if the interest be not paid when due, to become
as principal and bear the same rate of interest." It was held by the Kansas
court that the wording of this provision was for the manifest purpose of
evading the public policy of the state directed against compound interest;
and yet an application of the Edwards case might easily have led to treating the interest which was to become "'as principal" (on the analogy of
interest coupons which are considered part of the principal demand and
which bear interest themselves) as part of the principal demand, and therefore to be computed as part of the matter in controversy. Another example of inconsistency in applying the Edwards case was seen where the
court refused 83 to allow the interest coupons to be used in maturing the
bond and at the same time to be computed as part of the jursidictional
amount. If interest coupons are non-accessorial promises to pay, the fact
that their maturity may mature the bond should not bar their inclusion in
the jurisdictional amount.
Although it has been suggested 3 4 that when the obligation sued upon
is a definite promise to pay a certain sum of money upon the happening
of a certain event, as in the case of an insurance policy, the interest allowed for the failure to pay upon the happening of the specified event
should be excluded, such suggestion has not been followed with unanimity
by the courts in the insurance cases. In Continental Casualty Co. v.
Spradlin,3 the defendant insurance company refused to pay the amount
due on a policy of $2,000, in which there was no provision for interest,
and the court allowed the interest claimed to be computed as part of the
value of the matter in controversy. The antithetical result was reached
in Voorhees v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,3 6 in which the court felt that the Web31. See Christian v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 122 Calif. 117, 54 Pac.
518 (1898).
32. 27 F. (2d) 167 (D. Kan. 1928).
See Gilson v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life
Ass'n., 129 Fed. 1003 (C. C. W. D. Ky. 1904), in which the plaintiff argued that the
interest had been converted into principal by his petition on the analogy of the effect
of a judgment. "While, if there had been a judgment, the interest would be merged
therein so as thereafter to make the- whole debt principal, yet the court is clearly of
opinion . . . that the interest has not, by the mere frame of the plaintiff's petition,
been transmitted into principal. The utmost that can be said of the petition is that
it seeks to recover compound interest, but, in the opinion of the court, it is nevertheless interest, and nothing more, within the meaning of the judiciary act. . . ." Id.
at ioo4. See also Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Oregon Short Line Ry., 114 Fed. 787
(C. C. D. Mont. 39o2). For the problem in the state courts see.Howe v. Halsey, 6
Cal. Unrep. 148, 54 Pac. 748 (898).
33. Home & Foreign Investment & Agency Co. v. Ray, 69 Fed. 657 (C. C. N. D.
Ga. 1895). Compare Lowenthal v. Georgia Coast & P. R. Co., 233 Fed. ioli, Io5
(S. D. Ga. 1916).
34. DomIE, op. cit. supa note 5 at 155.
35. 17o Fed. 322 (C. C. A. 4th, 1909). Query: How controlling was the fact that
there was no contractual stipulation for interest?
36. 25o Fed. 484 (D. N. J. 1918).
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ster doctrine had been carried to its breaking point. For a while it was
believed 37 that this' open cleavage in the decisions of the lower courts had
been resolved by the tacit approval of the Spradlin case by the Supreme
Court in 1929, but such approval has been regarded as illusory. 8 On the
other hand, when the plaintiff's suit has been based on premiums paid
either under mutual mistake 39 or in excess 40 of the required number,
interest has been consistently excluded under the statute 4s accessory.
The problem of costs, that handmaiden of interest in the federal statute,
has troubled the courts considerably less because of its somewhat more
limited scope. The costs which are enumerated in the Judicial Code,4 such
as protest fees, 42 are definitely excluded by the statute. But the central
problem arose after many of .our states passed statutes 43 providing that
when insurance companies refuse in bad faith to pay the proceeds of their
policies after the risk has occurred, an attorney's fee in a suit by the
beneficiary of the policy shall be taxed against the company as part of
the costs of the suit. The courts seized upon the distinction between such
a statutory provision to pay an attorney's fee and an obligation to pay the
fee which is part of the contract between the parties. When the maker of
a promissory note promises to pay an attorney's fee if suit is brought on
the note, such fee is considered part of the principal demand, and there-,
fore to be included in the value of the matter in controversy' 44 Such was
37. In Brush v. World Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 33 F. (2d) ioo7 (S. D. Fla. 1929)
the policy was for $3.ooo, but in the ad damnurn damages to the amount of $5,0oo
were asked including interest. (The court said that it felt bound by the decision in
the Spradlin case which it thought had been approved by the Supreme Court in the
case of Springsteadv. Crazfordsville State Bank, note 45 infra.) In 5 ALA. L. J. the
result is rationalized on the basis of dictionary definitions, a distinction being drawn
between interest as a premium paid by a borrower for the use of. what he borrows and
interest as damages for the retention by the company of its own money on the theory
that the money was not due to the plaintiff. But see Merrigan v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 43 F. Supp. 2o9 (E. D. La. 1942) at 21o: "But interest, no matter whether
looked upon as the measure of the damages suffered by reason of the nonpayment of
money when due is still interest in its very nature, and interest cannot be included
in 'the matter in controversy'. . . ." "Interest is ever interest; because of its very
nature it is a penalty, and referring to it as such, makes it none the less interest.' Id.
at 211.
38. Gilliland v. Colorado Life Co., 15 F. Supp. 367 (W. D. Mo. 1936).
39. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harwood, 16 F. (2d) 250 (C. C. A. ist, 1926).
40. Simmons v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 114 Fed. 785 (C. C. Ga. 19o2).
41. "The following fees and no other shall be taxed and allowed to attorneys,
solicitors, and proctors in the courts of the United States, and to district attorneys,
except in cases otherwise expressly provided by law. But nothing herein shall be construed to prohibit attorneys, solicitors, and proctors from charging to and receiving
from their clients, other than the Government, such reasonable compensation for their
services, in addition to the taxable costs, as may be in accordance with general usage
in their respective States, or may be agreed upon between the parties :" 28 U. S. C.
§ 571 (1941). 28 U. S. C., ch. 16 covers costs in the federal courts. (Formerly Rzv.
STAT. §§ 823, 824 (1875).)
42. Baker v. Howell, 44 Fed. 113 (C. C. D. Neb. i8go) P sued on a note for
$2,0oo and added $3.5o as a protest fee. Held: jurisdictional amount lacking; approved in Rogers v. Riley, 8o Fed. 759, 761 (C. C. Ky. 1896). Contra: Dallyn v.
Brady, 205 Fed. 430 (M. D. Pa. 1913). relying on Wilson v. Lenox, i Cranch 194
(U. S. 18o3), decided before protest fees were allowed by federal statute, 28 U. S. C.
A. §830 (1927), formerly REv. STAT. §983 (1875).
43. Note, 48 HARV. L. REV. 319, 326 (1934) Preventing Litigious Delay in Paynent of Inmirance Claims.
44. Rogers v. Riley, 8o Fed. 759 (C. C. Ky. 1896) ; Howard v. Carroll, 195 Fed.

646 (D. Md.

1912).
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the rule enunciated by the Supreme Court in Springstead v. Craz4ordsville
State Bank. 45 Although two prior decisions 46 of Circuit Courts had held
to the contrary, the Supreme Court also allowed 47 an attorney's fee to be
computed as part of the jurisdictional amount where such fee was allowed
by a state statute of the type described above. In considering the implications of removal procedure in such a case, the Court per Justice Stone
rested its decision in part on the following consideration of policy:
"Disregarding mere matters of form it is clear that it is the policy of
the state to allow the plaintiff to recover an attorney's fee in certain
cases, and it has made that policy effective by making the allowance
of the fee mandatory on its courts in those cases. 'It would be at least
anomalous if this policy could be thwarted and the right so plainly
given destroyed by the removal of the cause to the federal courts."4s
49
This holding was reaffirmed in Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Joues,
also a case of removal from a state court. In general then, whether the
attorney's fee is allowed by a state statute or is contracted for by the parties,
the courts do not consider such fee as costs in the ordinary sense or coming
within the prohibition of the federal statute. If the state statute is so

45. 231 U. S. 541 (1913)

at 542: "Clearly such fee was no part of the costs, nor

was it interest. It may be that the agreement to pay an attorney's fee in the event of
suit created only an accessorial right (though under Brown v. Webster . . . this
is doubtful), but nevertheless it gave a right to recover and created a legal obligation
to pay." Accord: Merrigan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 43 F. Supp. 209, 211 (E.
D. La. 1942) ; Wilson v. Alliance Life Ins. Co., 1O8 F. (2d) 15o (C. C. A. 5th, 1939) ;
Curtis v. Harris, Davis & Co., 272 Fed. 265 (C. C. A. 5th, 1921) ; Lee Line Steamers
v. Robinson, 232 Fed. 417 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916); Le Roy v. Hartwick,

229

Fed. 857

(D. Ark. 1916); Coolidge v. Ray, 75 Fed. 39 (C. C. N. D. Ga. 1896). Compare
Tachi Sanada v. Kuwase, 28 Haw. 480, 483 (1925); Gourley v. Williams, 149 Pac.
(Okla. 1915) ; De Jarnatt v. Marquez, 127 Calif. 558, 6o Pac. 45 (19oo) ; Beach
v. Atkinson, 87 Ga. 288, 13 S. E. 59i (i89i) ; Fields v. Horn, 136 Tenn. 63o, r91 S.
E. 331 (1917).
46. Swofford v. Cornucopia Mines of Oregon, 14o Fed. 957, 958 (C. C. Ore. 1905)
229

in which the statute read: "In all suits under this act the court shall, upon entering
judgment for the plaintiff, allow as part of the costs all moneys paid for the filing and
recording of the lien and also a reasonable amount as attorney's fees." Peters v.
Queen Ins. Co. of America, 182 Fed. 113, 114 (C. C. S. D. Ga. 1916), in which the
statute read: "The several insurance companies of this state . . . in all cases when
a loss occurs, and they refuse to pay the same within sixty days after a demand shall
have been made by the holder of the policy on which said loss occurred, shall be
liable to pay the holder of said policy . . . in addition to the loss

. . . also, all

reasonable attorney's fees for the prosecution of the case against said company, provided it shall be made to appear to the jury trying the same that the refusal of the
company to pay said loss was in bad faith."
47. Sioux County v. National Surety Co., 276 U. S. 238 (1928).
48. Id. at 243.
49. 290 U. S. 199 (933).

Commented'on in 12 TEX. L. REv. 363 (i934). Accord:
Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n. v. Bowman, 96 F. (2d) 7 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938) ;
New York Underwriters' Fire Ins. Co. v. Malham & Co., 25 F. (2d) 415 (C. C. A.
8th, 1928).

See also Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Carlson, 126 F. (2d) 607, 6II

(C. C. A. ioth, 1942) : "The fact that statutes providing for the assessment of attorney's fees designate them as costs does not make them such as that term is generally
used and understood. Statutes providing for attorneys' fees impose a liability which
one may enforce as a matter of right. Such fees are put in controversy in the suit
and are a part of the substantive right." Cf. Orlando Candy Co. v. New Hampshire
Fire Ins. Co., 51 F. (2d) 392 (S. D. Fla. I931) ; Business Mens Assur. Co. v. Camp-"
bell, i8 F. (2d) 223 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927). Contra: Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v.
Johnson, i86 Ark. 519, 54 S. W. (2d) 407 (1932) ; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Marsh, I85
Ark. 332, 47 S. W. (2d) 585 (1932).
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drawn as to permit the attorney's fee to be treated as a penalty 50 or as
damages, 51 it is evident that under the Webster doctrine such fee will be
considered part of the principal demand and to be included in the jurisdictional amount. Also, where the state statute provides for the recovery of
a reasonable attorney's fee, the amount of the fee demanded must appear
reasonable 52 to the court. 53
An interesting variation of the interaction between a state statute and
the federal statute grew out of a case in which the plaintiff demanded
judgment for $2,999 together with costs and disbursements of the action.
The defendant, in opposing the plaintiff's motion to remand to the state
court, contended that the federal statute does not mention disbursements,
and therefore the jurisdictional amount was present since disbursements
could be added to the damages. But by the Civil Practice Act of New
York disbursements were made part of the bill of costs, and the court denied jurisdiction for the reason that the matter in controversy did not
exceed the three thousand dollar minimum exclusive of interest and costs.5 4
Finally, costs of the suit in question must always be distinguished from
those costs which enter only incidentally 56 into determining the value of
the matter in controversy, as where the holder of state tax certificates
sought to enjoin a state official from issuing redemption certificates without requiring the payment of certain costs and penalties which had accrued.
The intention of Congress embodied in the Act of 1888, which introduced the problem of interest and costs, and the intention expressed again
in the Act of 191I,'1 which raised the jurisdictional amount in the District
Courts to $3,000, was to restrict access to the federal courts. Yet, as we
have seen, the meaning given to the term interest by the Supreme Court
in the Webster and Edwards cases (although in the former case based
upon considerations of different theories of remedy, and in the latter case
upon considerations of commercial policy) proved inconsistent with the
Congressional policy of delimitation of federal jurisdiction. Congress did
not deal basically in the Judiciary Act of 1925 57 with the pressing problem of alleviating the congestion in the dockets of the District Courts; but
it must inevitably face that problem, particularly as federally-created rights
become more numerous. Meanwlhile judicial self-help is available in the
form of repudiating for jurisdictional purposes differences in the treatment
(however valid in other contexts) of interest. No longer should access
to the federal courts depend upon the sophistication 58 with which the claim
of interest is pleaded.
M.L.W.
5o. Conner v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 292 Fed. 767, 768 (S. D. Fla. 1923).
51. Nathan v. Rock Spring Distilling Co., io F. (2d) 268 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926).
52. Colorado Life Co. v. Steele, 95 F. (2d) 535 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938).
P claimed
$1,300 plus $5oo for hospital expenses and a 12 per cent. statutory penalty, i. e., $2,o16,
all the items recoverable except a "reasonable attorney's fee" as allowed by statute. To
bring this amount to the jurisdictional minimum would require in excess of $984. The
record on appeal was 40 pages and,the trial lasted two days. The court held that the
fee demanded was unreasonable.
53. Globe Indemnity Co. v. Sulpho-Saline Bath Co., 299 Fed. 219 (C. C. A. 8th,
1924).
54. Cogswell v. Tribune Co., 16 F. Supp. 631 (S. D. N. Y. 1936).
55. Glen Inv. Co. v. Romero, 254 Fed. 239 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918).
56. Supra note i.
57. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, 43 STAT. 936 (1925).
8. "The nature of the matter in dispute and the amount or sum thereof are to
be determined from a consideration of plaintiff's petition. . . . If plaintiff had sued
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Privilege of Majority Shareholders to Dissolve the Corporation or to
SellAll or Substantially All of Its Assets Over the
Protests of the Minority
Whether the majority of shareholders in a corporation may dissolve it
either formally or by a sale or other disposition of its assets,1 against2 the
wishes of the minority has long been the subject of a conflict of opinion.
One line of cases apparently holds that the majority shareholders have
no power voluntarily to dissolve the corporation (in any sense of that
term), without the unanimous consent of all the shareholders, unless there
are present in the case some circumstances which reasonably justify the
majority in bringing the corporate business to an end.
Another line of cases interpret the law as providing that the majority
do have the inherent right to terminate the corporate business whenever
they see fit, subject only to the limitation that the circumstances be free of
any element of fraud or unfairness.
On comparing these two views, it is apparent that in jurisdictions following the dogma as first stated, the courts throw the burden of proof
upon the majority shareholders, or their successors in interest, to prove the
presence of circumstances which would reasonably justify the majority
in acting as they did. Likewise in those jurisdictions following the second
application of the dogma, a burden is placed upon the dissenting minority
to show the presence of elements of fraud and unfairness sufficient to defeat
the privilege of the majority to so act.
But is the shifting of the burden of proof the only distinction to be
drawn between these two statements of the applicable law? Certainly there
may be factual situations to which courts will react similarly, regardless of
which statement of the dogma they purport to apply, either by ifivoking
for damages, it might be argued . . . that the demand for damages (although
measured by the interest standard) was a part of the principal demand and not merely
an incident thereof or accessory thereto. The plaintiff in this case, however, claims
nothing by way of damages. Plaintiff claims interest on $2,50o as interest. If he is
entitled to recover anything as interest, then that amount is not to be calculated in
determining the jurisdictional amount involved. If, perchance, plaintiff would be
entitled to recover an amount in addition to the $2,500 for which he sues, not as interest on the $2,5oo, but as damages for the unlawful detention of that amount by the defendant, then he has not sued for that additional amount in this case." Per Otis,
District Judge, in Gilliland v. Colorado Life Co., 15 F. Supp. 367 (W. D. Mo.
1936). commented on -in ii U. OF CINN. L. REv. 1io (1937). See also, Fernandina
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Peters, et al., 283 Fed. 621 (S.D. Fla. 1922).
I. The scope of this note is limited to a discussion of those -situations where the
corporation is effectively prevented from continuing to carry out its corporate purposes. As a result, a technical voluntary dissolution of a corporation, in compliance
with statutory prerequisites to bring about the voluntary surrender of the corporate
franchise to the state, and a sale of all or substantially all of the assets will be treated
together. Since th6 corporation, by the voluntary acts of its shareholders in either
manner, loses its ability to carry on and fulfill the purposes for which it has been
organized, in general the same rules of law ought to apply.
It should also be noted that a discussion of those fact situations which give rise to
the question of the power of the majority to sell or otherwise dispose of all the assets
in pursuance of the purpose for which the corporation was organized as such purpose
is defined in the articles will therefore not be relevant and hence will not be discussed.
2. 3 CooK, CoR'oRATIONS (8th ed. 1923) § 629; 8 THomPsolN, CoRsoRAioNs (3rd
ed. 1927) -§ 6455; 16 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATONs, § 5021 (Perm. Ed. 1931).
See also Fain, Limitatfons of Statutory Power of Majority Shareholders to Dissolve
a Corporation (1912) 25 HARv. L. REv. 677; and cf. Warren, Voluntary Transfers of
Corporate Undertakings (ig16) 2o HARv. L. REv. 535. For additional discussion of
the same problem see Note (IIS) 2 MINN. L. REV. 526.
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the word "fraud and unfairness" on the one hand, or by merely denying
the presence of facts sufficient to justify the act on the other. On the other
hand, there may be many situations where all courts will permit the majority to exercise a privilege of selling or dissolving by refusing to invoke
the concept of "fraud" or by analyzing the situation as one where the
facts do reasonably justify the majority in their actions.
An analysis of the factual situations, however, which give rise to the
language of the courts will indicate that such will not always be the case.
There are, as will hereafter be developed, many factual situations, where a
blind adherence to either of the statements of the dogma has produced a
different result and has left a considerable portion of the field in hopeless confusion.'
The purpose of this note is to limit and define: (A) the factual situations where it is universally agreed that a majority of the shareholders may
dissolve the corporation despite the protests of the minority; (B) those
situations where it is universally held that unanimity of consent by all the
shareholders is required; and (C) that area of case law in which the decisions are conflicting.
A. THE FACTUAL SITUATIONS WHERE

IT IS UNIVERSALLY AGREED THAT
A MAJORITY OF THE SHAREHOLDERS MAY TERMINATE THE CORPORATE BUSINESS AND DISPOSE OF ITS ASSETS DESPITE THE DISSENT
OF THE MINORITY

Where there is present no element of unfairness to any of the shareholders, and the assets are being disposed of at a fair price and for cash,
so that such shareholder, as a result of the winding up, wil receive the
fair value of his shares, all the authorities agree that the majority have the
power to wind up the business in the following situations:
4
I. Where the corporationbecomes insolvent.
5
2. Where its capital has been substantially impaired.
3. Before attempting an analysis it is important to note that the question may come

before the courts in a number of ways.
(a) A petition of the majority shareholders to the court of equity to assume jurisdiction and appoint receivers to wind up the corporation and sell all of its assets.
(b) A bill for an injunction brought by the minority shareholders on behalf of
the corporation to enjoin the majority from carrying through their contemplated scheme

of dissolution or sale of all the assets.
(c) A bill brought by the minority on behalf of the corporation for rescission
of the sale already effectuated and restoration of the property involved to the original
corporation in which the petitioners were minority shareholders.
(d) An action for damages brought by the minority shareholders on behalf of the
corporation against the directors or majority shareholders for damages suffered by the
corporation because of the action of the majority.
(e) By an action for damages brought by the minority shareholders against the
directors or majority shareholders for special damages suffered by the minority share-

holders themselves because of the action of the majority.
(f) By quo warranto proceedings instituted by the state of incorporation against
the corporation and directors upon the relation of the dissenting minority.
Of course the type of relief prayed for under the situations will to some extent
affect the readiness or reluctance of the courts to deny or affirm the existence of the
privilege in the majority, but the cases do not present on their facts any sufficient
consistency of result because of the nature of the relief demanded to warrant any
categorical statement as to the extent to which a difference in the remedy sought will
affect the ultimate outcome of the cases.
4. Treadwell v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 73 Mass. 393 (1856) ; Phillips v. Providence
Steam Engine Co., 21 R. I. 302, 43 Atl. 598 (1899) ; and Wilson v. Proprietors of
Central Bridge, Inc., et al., 9 R. I. 590 (i87o).
5. Hancock v. Holbrook, 9 Fed. 353 (C. C. E. D. La. 1881) ; Price v. Halcomb,
84 Iowa 123, 56 N. W. 408 (1893) ; Sawyer v. Dubuque Printing Co., 77 Iowa 242, 42
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3. Where, although the capital has not been impaired, the business

prognosis of the corporate activity appears unpromising, and there is reason for the majority of the shareholdersto fear that a continuation of the
business might subject them to loss and insolvency."
In these cases, the courts are agreed that the majority should not be
compelled to continue the business enterprise. In situations where these
elements are present, it is universally held that the decision of the majority
to wind up and salvage what they can must be regarded as a legitimate
exercise of business judgment to which the minority must submit.
4. Where, after the corporationis formed, but before it actually begins
to transact business, the majority decide to abandon the enterprise.7 Here
again it is universally held that the decision of the majority as to the wisdom
of going ahead with the business enterprise is an exercise of business
judgment which the minority has no power to override.
5. Where the corporation is forned as a non profit organization to
serve some special purpose of the shareholders (each one of whom contributes membership dues), and, because of a change in conditions, a continuation of the corporate activities will no longer serve any useful purpose
of the majority.8 Under these circumstances, it is held that it would be
unjust to compel the majority to choose between continuing to pay membership dues in an organization which is no longer of any use to them, or as
an alternative, to drop out and lose their interests in the contributions they
have theretofore made. Hence, again, the decision of the majority to
wind up the business is binding notwithstanding the protests of a dissenting
minority.'
N. W. 300 (889).

Calnan v. Guaranty Security Corp., 27, Mass. 533, 171 N. E. 830
(193o); Cardiff v. Johnson, 126 Wash. 454, 218 Pac. 269 (1923) ; Pitcher v. Lone
Pine-Surprise Consol. Mining Co., 39 Wash. 6o8, 81 Pac. lO47 (19o5).
6. Arants v. Blackwells Durham Tobacco.Co., io Fed. 338, 346 (C. C. E. D. S.
C. I9oo), where the court, while recognizing a general rule that equity could exercise
no jurisdiction over the dissolution of a prosperous corporation, stated that it would

always grant relief against corporation where proper equitable grounds were shown,
adding "A recognized ground of relief in equity is when the affairs of the corporation
are not satisfactory, when it is in the midst of or is theartened with disaster, when
further prosecution of its business will lead to loss and insolvency." See also: Beidenkopf v. Insurance Co., 16o Iowa 629, i42 . E. 434 (1913), which concerned a bill in
equity by the minority shareholders to enjoin the sale and transfer of the business and
property of a very prosperous, insurance company. Reason given for the majority's
resolution to dissolve was that the officers who had in the past been largely responsible
for the success of the company, wished to retire and the majority feared that the business could not be profitably operated without them. Despite the fact that an Iowa
statute provided that there could be no dissolution of a corporation prior to expiration
of the charter by less than unanimous consent of the shareholders where the corporation was solvent, the court refused to issue the injunction sought stating at page 646,
"If it be wise to say that a corporation may dispose of all of its assets when overcome
by disaster, it is even more wise and just to say they may do likewise to prevent a
disaster and preserve a solvency, the permanence of which changed conditions have
rendered insecure."
7. State v. Chilhowee Woolen Mills, 115 Tenn. 266, 89 S. W. 741 (1905).
8. Hitch v. Hawley, 132 N. Y. 212, 30 N. E. 401 (1892) (overruling decision of

county sub norn., In re Importer's and Grocers Exchange of N. Y., 2 N. Y. Supp. 257
(1888)). The court applied the doctrine that where the interests of the shareholders
of the corporation were so discordant as to prevent efficient management, and a large
majority of both the directors and members wish to wind up its affairs, a dissolution
thereof will be beneficial to the interests of the shareholders, because the object of its
corporate existence cannot be attained. To the same effect, where membership in a
corporation to promote temperance fell off to a negligible figure, see Idan Liitto Temperance Society v. Isakson, 219 Mass. 95, io6 N. E. 976 (1914).
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SITUATIONS WHERE IT IS UNIVERSALLY HELD THAT UNANIMITY OF
CONSENT BY ALL THE SHAREHOLDERS IS REQUIRED

I. Where the considerationfor the sale is not cash, but is shares, bonds
or other securities of a purchasing corporation.0 This holding is based
upon the generally accepted doctrine that a minority shareholder cannot be
compelled against his will to become engaged in any business except that
in which he has chosen to invest his money. To compel the minority
shareholder thus to exchange his shares for such securities of the purchasing corporation, forces him to accept business risks not of his own choosing
and to forego control over the alienability of his own property which is a
property right recognized and protected by the courts.
This rule may be qualified, however, by the presence of additional
factors. There may be a different result, for example, when additional arrangements are made whereby some third party agrees to buy for cash all
of the securities which the dissenting shareholders refuse to accept in exchange for their shares. Thus, in effect, the non assenting shareholders
can be paid out in cash.' 0 Similarly, where the capital of the corporation
is substantially impaired, the court may refuse to enjoin the exchange of all
the assets for such securities, when such securities have a ready market
value in excess of the book value of the shares of the minority for which
they are offered in exchange."
2. Where the trmsaction involves a lease of the assets to another, the
dissenting shareholdercannot be compelled to accept in lie of his share of
the profits of the company as a going concern, a pro rata share of the rentals.
To hold otherwise would substitute the business activities of a landlord,
for those activities authorized by the articles of incorporation, in furtherance
of which the minority shareholder invested his money.' 2 Of course, such
9. Morris v. Elyton Land Co., 125 Ala. 263, 28 So. 513 (899) ; Elyton Land Co.
v. Dowdell, 113 Ala. 177, 20 So. 981 (i8g6); Byrne v. Schuyler Electric Mfg. Co.,
65 Conn. 336, 31 Atl. 635 (1895) ; New Orleans, Jackson and Great Northern R. Co.
v. Harris, 27 Miss. 517 (1894) ; Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R. Co., 30 Pa. 42 (1858).
io. Bowditch v. Jackson Co., 76 N. H. 351, 22 Atl. 1014 (1912). To a like effect
see Patterson v. Shattuck Arizona Copper Co., I86 Minn. 611, 244 N. W. 281 (1932),
where the minofity shareholders were given the option of accepting the securities of the
new corporation, or the book value of their shares-in the selling corporation at the
time of the contemplated transfer.
ii. Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Co., 254 U. S. 590 (1920), rev'd on other grounds
(shares of stock in purchasing corporation) ; Calnan v. Guaranty Security Corp., 271
Mass. 533, 171 N. E. 830 (1930), (bonds of purchasing corporation).
Cf. American Seating Co. v. Bullard, 290 Fed. 896 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923), where it
was held that dissenting minority had the right to recover the market value of their
shares in the selling corporation, despite the fact that the capital of such corporation
was substantially impaired. Since the purchasing corporation, in this situation, was
a new one formed as part of a plan of corporate reorganization, it is very doubtful that
securities issued by it had a very ready active market in which the dissenters could
obtain cash.
Note also that if a dissenting shareholder accepts part of his shares of the purchasing corporation, he may not thereafter object to the transaction. Treadwell v.
Verde Copper Co., 134 N. Y. App. Div. 394, 119 N. Y. 112 (19o9); cf. Elyton Land
Co. v. Dowdell, 113 Ala. 177, 20 So. 981 (i896), where the consideration for the sale
was shares and marketable bonds of the purchasing corporation. Held acceptance of
the bonds by the dissenter did not thereafter preclude him from objecting to the transaction with respect to the shares of stock where the bonds were more readily marketable.
So too, if dissenting shareholder is guilty of laches. Boston, etc., R. v. New York,
etc., R., 13 R. I. 260 (1883).
12. Dow v. Northern Railroad Co., 87 N. H. I, 36 AtI. 520 (1887).
Cf. Plant
v. Macon Oil & Ice Co., 103 Ga. 666, 30 S. E. 567 (1898), where the corporation
rented its property for the purpose of raising money necessary to pay a pressing in-
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argument could not be raised by the dissenting shareholder where such a
lease was authoribed by the articles of incorporation. If the provisions of
the articles grant any power to the majority shareholders, the minority will
be deemed to have consented to the exercise of that power in advance, as

a condition to becoming members of the corporation. 13
3. Where the consideration for the sale is inadequate, even though it
be for cash. Under these circumstances, it is universally agreed that to
permit the majority to dispose of all the corporate property for an inadequate price would operate as a fraud on the dissenting minority. Each
share of stock represents a proportion of the wealth of the corporation.
As a result, every shareholder (and that of course includes the minority)
has the legal and equitable right to insist that when liquidation of the corporate assets is necessary, the assets be sold for the highest
price obtainable
14
under market conditions existing at the time of the sale.

4. Where the transactioninvolves a gratuitous transfer of all the assets
of a non profit corporation to another company that undertakes to hold
such assets in trust for the same purposes for which they were held by the
transferor. Despite the good faith of the majority they have no right to
give away the assets of the company even in trust for the same charitable
purposes. The dissenting members have a right to complain that by making such a transfer the corporation is unlawfully delegating its powers as
a trustee to another.1 5
C. SITUATIONS WHERE THE AUTHORITIES ARE CONFLICTING AS TO TIE
NECESSITY FOR UNANIMITY OF CONSENT OF ALL SHAREHOLDERS

An exaiination of the cases discloses that whenever a factual situation
arises which does not fit into any of the foregoing classifications, the authorities are conflicting. To illustrate the point, suppose a corporation is not
insolvent and its capital has not been impaired. Indeed it is a profitable
going concern. Nevertheless the majority of shareholders, for reasons
debtedness which could not otherwise be met, and the term of the lease was limited
to one year. Held: The majority shareholders have the power to rent the property
temporarily when the purpose of such action is not an abandonment of its franchise,
but to meet an urgent necessity of raising a fund to enable the corporation to eventually
continue the business profitably.
Note, however, where the making of such a lease is expressly authorized by a
statute which makes provisions for dissenting shareholders to be paid out in cash, the
value of their shares at a fair appraisal, there can be no valid objection by the minority.
Black v. Delaware Canal, 22 N. J. Eq. 130 (1871).

Even in this situation, however,

where the purpose to be accomplished by effectuating the lease is one which the courts
do not countenance, a different result may be reached. To this effect see Allen v.
Francesco Sugar Co., 92 N. J. Eq. 391, i1O Atl. 37 (192o), where an attempt by the

majority to lease all the assets to a specially created Cuban corporation for the purpose
of avoiding payment bf Federal income taxes was enjoined at the request of a minority
shareholder.
13. 6 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS, § 2478 (Perm. ed. 1931); Orlando
Orange Groves Co. v. Hale, 107 Fla. 304, 144 So. 674 (1932) ; Hagerman v. Southpark Com'rs., 278 Ill. App. 33 (1934) ; State ex tel. Barret v. First Nat. Bank of St.
Louis, 297 Mo. 397, 249 S. W. 61g (1923) ; Mercedes Produce Co. v. Roddy, 249 S. W.
249 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1923).
14. Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U. S. 590 (i921); Lebold v.
Inland Steel Co.. 125 F. (2d) 369 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941); Erwin v. Oregon Ry. &
Navigation Co., 27 Fed. 625 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1886). Even where property is sold
at public sale such sale will be enjoined if there be no advertising and no proper notice
of the precise assets being sold. Treadwell v. United Verde Copper Co., 47 N. Y. App.
613, 62 N. Y. Supp. 708 (1900).

15. Henry v. Cox, 25 Ohio App. 487, 159 N. E. IoI (1927).
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which to them seem sufficient, 16 vote to wind up the business either by
formal dissolution proceedings or by the sale of all or substantially all of
its assets, for an adequate cash consideration. Do the dissenting minority
have a right to any relief ?
This question has arisen and been adjudicated in the following different types of situations -I. The najority conchide that an offer they have received for all the
assets of the corporation is finawially attractive and pass an appropriate
resolution to consummate the sale for cash.
One line of decisions holds that the majority may so act..7 This holding is based on the court's approval of the fundamental desirability of
majority rule. There courts reason that the majority of the directors may
act despite the dissentient voice of a minority where such an act is within
the everyday conduct of the corporate affairs. In extraordinary matters,
therefore, where the shareholders have not delegated to the directors, the
power to bind the corporation, but have reserved the powers to themselves,
then the entire body of shareholders are, for this purpose, acting as directors, and the same rules of majority control should apply.' 8
Additional grounds are advanced by many courts by analagy to situations where the corporation is insolvent or in a failing condition. If, runs
the argument, the majority have the power to sell all the assets when the
corporation is insolvent, or its capital is impaired, or to prevent prospective losses, it is only carrying logic one step further to permit the majority
to sell to make a profit for all of the shareholders. Such an act requires
the exercise of the same business judgment as all the courts sanction in
those other situations. The basic reason why the shareholders banded
together to form the association was to engage in business for profit, and
if a larger profit can be made by terminating the enterprise than by continuing it, they should not be prevented from doing so.'9
16. It might well be noted here that while theoretically the problem might arise
where the majority shareholders merely desire to wind up the enterprise for the sole
purpose of retiring from business entirely without intending to serve any ulterior motive or accomplish any business advantage by the transaction, a practical approach to
the problem clearly indicates that it would be a most unusual situation and one not
likely to develop. In practically all of the recorded cases the problem is rather one
where the majority are attempting to accomplish some definite economic advantage by
their action, and in the aspects of the problem hereafter discussed, it is important to
bear in mind the precise purpose for which the majority attempts to act and the degree
to which the courts consider these purposes socially and economically desireable.
17. Kirwen v. Parkway Distillery, Inc., :285 Ky. 6o5, 148 S. W. (2d) 720 (1941);
Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 261 Mass. 556, 159 N. E. 70
(1928) ; Bowditch v. Jackson Co., 76 N. H. 351, 82 Atl. 1014 (1912). See also Trisconi v. Winship, 43 La. Ann. 45, 9 So. 29 (1891), and dictum in Beidenkopf v. Des
Moines Life Insurance Co., 16o Iowa 629, 142 N. W. 434 (1913) ; Price Vr.Holcomb,
89 Iowa 123, 56 N. W. 401 (1893); Treadwell v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 73 Mass. 393
(1856) ; Lauman v. Lebanon Valley Railroad Corp., 3o Pa. 42 (1858).
iS. For a statement of this rule of law see the Opinion of the Justices to the House
of Representatives, 261 Mass. 556, 189 N. E. 70 (1928), where the court was called
upon to advise the house as to the constitutionality of a bill providing for authorization for a street railway to dissolve on the consent of the majority shareholders where
the charter was silent on this point, despite the fact that at the time of the incorporation there was no statutory provision one way or another. In upholding the validity
of the proposed legislation, the court stated, at page 261 : "It is a general principle of
the administration of corporations that the majority in value of the shareholders declare the policy of the corporation, in the absence of special provisions to the contra.
Unanimity on the part of all shareholders as to corporate action is not required by
any principle of law. Dissenting shareholders are bound by the vote of the majority,
acting in good faith and with legislative sanction."
ig. Bowditch v. Jackson Co., 76 N. H. 35r, 82 Atl. 1014 (1912).
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Another body of case law favors a different result, 2 basing such con-

clusion on the ground that the minority have a vested property right, rising
out of their contract as shareholders that the corporation will continue the
operation of the business as long as it remains profitable to do so, or until
the corporate franchise expires under the terms of the articles of association. Many courts, couching this same thought in other words, state that
the majority have no right to deprive the minority of their potential future
earnings as shareholders; nor do they have any right to compel the minority
against their will to sell their interest in the company even for cash. It is
thereby urged that such a sale or dissolution operates to deprive the dissenting minority of their property without "due process of law." It is certain, however, that these courts manifestly err in describing such a transaction by the majority as a deprivation of property without due process of
law. It scarcely need be stated that due process of law as guaranteed by
the 5th and I4th Amendments of the Federal Constitution does not purport
to redress or prevent private wrongs but applies merely to acts 2by the State
or the Federal Government which might have this same effect. 1
It is also submitted that these arguments advanced to limit the privilege of the majority as infringing upon the vested property rights of the
minority are merely examples of circuitous reasoning sometimes developed
by the courts to justify a result believed by them to be desirable. It is the
relationship of the shareholders among themselves that creates the conflict.
It is first necessary to determine whether or not the majority has an implied
power to sell all the assets or dissolve the corporation. Only then can the
existence or nonexistence of "vested property rights" in the minority shareholders be ascertained. If the majority lacks such implied power, then
the rights of the minority may be termed "vested." Conversely if the majority 2 does
have such power, then the rights of the minority are not
2
vested.

In passing, it should be noted that this latter view was propounded
in the earlier cases. While that view has nowhere been overruled, the
present trend is in accord with the expansion of the powers of the majority
shareholders to at least this extent. It is submitted that such a trend is
a healthy development in the corporate law. It indicates at least a growing
willingness of the courts to abandon the old practice of analyzing case law
in terms of results and to adopt the more scientific method of examining
the factual circumstances present in the problem.
2. The majority conclude that it would be advantageous to the corporation to become domiciled under the laws of another state. To accomplish this purpose, they create a new corporation in the latter state and
pass a resolution agreeing to sell all of the assets of the old corporation at
a fair price to the new corporation. All shareholders are given the option
of acquiring an equal proportion of shares in the new corporation or of
receiving in cash their proportionate share of the purchase price of the
20. Kean v. Johnson and Central Railroad Co., 9 N. J. Eq. 401 (2853), cited with
approval in Meyerhoff v. Bankers Securities, Inc., 105 N. J. Eq. 76, 147 Atl. l05
(1929).

See Philips v. Providence Steam Engine Co., 21 R. I. 302, 43 Atl. 598 (2899);

and Wilson v. Proprietors of Central Bridge et al., 9 R. I. 590 (187o).
21. COOLEY, CONSTITuTIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1931), Chapter XXIV, §3: "Due
process of law has been held to be synonymous with the term 'law of the land,' and,
• that law of the land is held to have guaranteed or announced a practice of freedom, not only from arbitrary court and administrative procedure, but a freedom from
arbitrary, oppressive, or fundamentally unreasonable legislation." See also Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Erwin, 23 F. Supp. 70 (Minn. 1938) ; John J. McCarthy
Co. v. Alsop, 122 Conn. 288, 189 At. 464 (1936).
22. But see Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law (1946) 59 HARv. L. REv. 376.
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sale. It has been suggested in one case, "3 that the minority must submit
to the decision of the majority.
Another case reaches a contrary conclusion on these facts.2 4 The
decision, however, is based in part, on the ground that even with unanimous
consent, the corporation possesses no power to transfer all its assets for
such a purpose without the antecedent consent of the state of incorporation. It is submitted that the result reached in the latter case is fundamentally unsound. It is difficult to see why, in this situation, the majority
may not be said to be acting pursuant to sound business judgment, just
as it is conceded they do in the case of similar action by them where the
corporation is in poor financial condition. Here the purpose which is
motivating the majority is an economic advantage which will enure to the
common benefit of all shareholders. It is common knowledge that a corporation may be subject to more onerous restrictions as a foreign corporation than as a domestic corporation. 25 It should also be pointed out
that the question of the contract between the State and the corporation
should be immaterial in determining the rights of the shareholders inter se.
Therefore, the arguments which might be advanced to the effect that the
state of incorporation by consenting to the incorporation has become entitled to the payment of taxes by the corporation until the corporation is
dissolved with the consent of the state can not logically be applied in answering this question either one way or the other.
3. The majority decide that it would be to the best interests of the corporation that it merge or consolidate with another corporation. However,
there are valid statutory objections to the contemplated merger or consolidation. To circumvent such restrictions, the majority adopt resolutions
authorizing a sale of all the assets to the oher corporation for a fair price,
giving each of its shareholders the option to acquire a proportionate share
of the purchasing corporation's shares, or, in the alternative, to receive their
pro rata share of the purchase price.
One view is that the majority do have the power to make such a sale.2 6
These jurisdictions differentiate between a sale and a merger, holding that
23. Treadwell v. United Verde Copper Co., 134 N. Y. App. Div. 394, 111 N. Y.
Supp. 112 (Igog), where court issued a temporary order restraining the sale, but only
on the ground that the proposed price was inadequate. The court intimated, however,
that if the price were adequate, it would not interfere.
24. People v. Ballard et al., 134 N. Y. 269, 32 N. E. 54 (1892), where the court

said at page 294, "A corporation cannot cease to exist of its own will. Its life continues either until the charter period has expired or the court has decreed a dissolution. The law made it, and the law only can put an end to it. As it cannot take its
own life directly, it cannot do so indirectly, for that would be a fraud upon the law
and against public policy. . . . While a corporation may sell its property to pay its
debts or carry on its business, it cannot sell its property in order to deprive itself of
existence. . . . While the stockholders who consented may be estopped by their
acts, those who did not consent can take advantage of this violation of their rights,
and the State of New York can demand that those who did wrong shall make restitution."
See also Forrester v. Boston and Montana Consolidated Copper and Silver Mining Co., 21 Mont. 544, 55 Pac. 229 (1898), where the consideration for the sale was
securities of the purchasing corporation rather than cash.
25. Having the right to prohibit foreign corporations from doing business within
the State at all, it is within the power of the State to prohibit the transaction of business by the foreign corporation within the State except on compliance with such terms
or conditions as the state may in its discretion see fit to impose, unless such prohibition or restriction imposed is so conditioned as to violate some constitutional provision. To this effect see Boteler v. Conway, 13 Cal. App. (2d) 79, 56 P. (2d) 587
(1936) ; F. E. Nugent Funeral Home v. Beamish, 35 Pa. 345, 173 At. 177 (1934).
26. J. H. Lane & Co. v. Maple Cotton Mills, 226 Fed. 692 (C. C. A. 4th, 1915);
Slattery v. Greater New Orleans Realty & Devel. Co., 128 La. 871, 55 So. 558 (19,1).
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merger statutes apply only to the corporate acts brought about pursuant
to the statute and which will consequently alter the relationship between
the corporation and the state which created it. Restrictions imposed on
corporations by the merger statutes are the price which the state imposes
on the corporation in exchange for the state's permission to alter the fundamental relationship between them. Hence the prohibitions with respect to
mergers would have no application in this situation since, the vendor corporation by so acting is not accomplishing the same technical result as it
would by taking advantage of the merger provisions.
The antithetical conclusion is drawn by other authorities. 27 This
result is based upon the proposition that the statutory prohibitions against
mergers, under the circumstances, evidenci a legislative declaration of public policy against such transfers. It is submitted that it is extremely difficult categorically to state that either of these two conclusions is fundamentally sound or unsound. The criticism cannot be made without first
determining the basic underlying philosophy which lies behind the merger
statutes. If it be said that the purpose of the merger statutes is that suggested by the courts propounding the former view, then, clearly, those
courts are correct in their reasoning. On the other hand, if the statutes
are directed against the results achieved by merger, and consider it necessary to regulate the transaction to prevent the accomplishment of ends
deemed socially and economically undesirable by the legislature, then the
latter view is the more sound. It should be obvious that where an object
or purpose is forbidden, no distinction should be made on the basis of the
means employed to reach that end.
4. The majority of the shareholdersacting from purely selfish motives
come to the conclusion that it would be to their interest to take over the
going business for themselves and to "freeze out" some of the shareholders,
thus eliminating them from sharing in the future profits of the buiness.
To accomplish this purpose, they adopt a resolution to sell, at a fair price,
all the assets to themselves or to another corporation in which they own
substantially all the shares.
One line of authorities holds that the majority are acting within their
legal rights.28 These cases proceed on the theory that the majority shareholders have the right and power to dissolve the corporation whenever they
please, notwithstanding the objections of the minority. There is nothing
unfair about the majority's determination to wind up the business where
the price is adequate and each shareholder receives his pro rata share of
the proceeds in cash. The fact that the majority intend to re-organize
the business and continue it without the minority presents no unfairness;
27. Harding v. American Glucose Co., 182 Ill. 551. 55 N. E. 577 (1899) ; Riker
& Son Co. v. United Drug Co., 79 N. J. Eq. 580, 583, 82 AtI. 930, 931 (I912), where
the court said, "In the absence of legislation permitting a variation of the provisions
of this fundamental contract, by vote of a majority of the stockholders, no majority,
however large, has a right to divert any part of the joint capital, however small, to
any purpose not consistent with and growing out of this original, fundamental agreement."
See also Whicher v. Delaware Mines Corp., 52 Idaho 304, 15 P. (2d) 6Io (932);
and Moore v. Los Lugos Gold Mines, 172 Wash. 570, 21 P. (2d) 253 (1933). To the
same effect see 8 THoMPSON, CORORATIN S (3rd ed. 1927) § 5966, where it is said:
"A corporation has no inherent power to incorporate or reorganize. Generally a reorganization can be affected only by virtue of statutory authority. . . . The right to
reincorporate or to reorganize is like the right to incorporate in the first instance, and
can only be exercised by virtue of legislative authority."
28. May v. Midwest Refining Co., 121 F. (2d) 431 (C. C. A. 1st, 1941) ; Watkins
v. National Bank, 51 Kan. 254, 32 Pac. 914 (1893) ; Green v. Bennett, 11o S. W. io8
(Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 19o8).
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for the majority of the shareholders in the absence of fraud or unfair
dealing, have the privilege of dealing with the corporate matters as best
suits their own interests whether they be selfish or not.

Other cases reach the opposite result, 29 on the reasoning that it is

grossly unfair for the majority of persons associated together in a going
business to appropriate it for themselves and exclude some of the co-owners,
notwithstanding the fact that the latter are paid the fair value of their
interests.
It is submitted that the conclusions reached by the courts in this
factual situation, cannot be effectively analyzed as to their soundness until
additional factors are known. For example, if the money market were
stable, so that the dissenting shareholders could easily find another safe
and lucrative investment, there would be little point in holding that the
transaction forced great hardship on them. There is little sentimental
value attached to the fact that one is a shareholder in a business corporation for profit. A shareholder invests his money for the purely unsentimental reason of obtaining the greatest possible economic return for his
money compatible with its safety.
On the other hand if the money market is unstable and prices are
either rising or falling, it might be said that the shareholder who was forced
to part with his interest in the corporation was exposed to grave economic
risks and hence was forced to undergo hardship. If the transaction occurs
in an era of inflationary activity, the slightest delay between the time he is
"frozen out" of the one corporation and reinvests his money in some other
securities will be economically costly. If, one the other hand, he finds
himself in the midst of a deflationary period or a depression, he will find
it extremely difficult to obtain another investment which he might feel
is equally safe. Were the courts tr take judicial cognizance of this factor,
little fault might be found with their conclusion as to the fairness or unfairness of the majority action, since actually where all the factors affecting the situation are carefully evaluated, the ultimate determination will
depend upon the individual conscience of the court. It should also be
noted that once the problem of fairness has been determined, there still
remains the problem of the basic relationship between the shareholders; and
much of that which has been offered as comment upon the problem first
stated in this section is equally pertinent here.
CONCLUSION

An attempt has been made in the foregoing discussion to demonstrate
that while there are some irreconcilable conflicts in the basic legal premises
adopted by the courts of various jurisdictions, they are no more numerous
or puzzling than conflicts of principles which appear in many other fields
of the case law. Much of the confusion therefore which seems peculiar to
29.

Lebold v. Inland Steel Co.,

125 F. (2d)

369 (C. C. A. 7th,

1941) ;

Ervin v.

Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co., 27 Fed. 625 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1886); Paine v. Salusburg,
200 Mich. 58. 166 N. W. 1o36 (1918); Meyerhoff v. Bankers Securities Inc., 105
N. J. Eq. 176, 147 Alt o5 (1929) ; Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N. Y.
,85, 123 N. E. 148 (1919) ; Abbott v. American Hard Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578 (N.
Y. 1861) ; Theis v. Spokane Falls Gas Light Co., 34 Wash. 23, 74 Pac. 1oo4 (1904).

Note that in Lebold v. Inland S. S. Co., 82 F. (2d) 35, (C. C. A. 7th, 1936),
where the shareholders first adopted a formal resolution to dissolve and a dissenting
shareholder sought to enjoin the dissolution on the ground that it was a mere cloak
for a contemplated sale of all the assets to the majority, the court refused the injunction and asserted that it would consider the question only when such a sale was actually
attempted.
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this problem could be eliminated by carefully analyzing the factual situations which give rise to the problems. It need only be noted that the right
of the majority to terminate the business of a corporation over the dissenting voice of the minority, either by a sale of all the assets or by a technical dissolution, cannot be categorically affirmed or denied. The determination of each case must depend upon the circumstances out of which
it arises, and all factors must be weighed-not only with respect to the
ultimate effect of the transaction upon the relationship.of the shareholders,
but also with respect to the ultimate purpose which will be served by the
majority's action.
R.R.L.

